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Nigeria's Crisis of Corruption-Can
the U.N. Global Programme Hope to
Resolve this Dilemma?

ABSTRACT

Transparency Internationalconsistently rates the levels of
corruption in Nigeria among the highest in the world.
Pervasive corruption appears to permeate many levels of
Nigerian society. The current Nigerian government, however,
has taken great steps to combat this problem through
cooperation with the U.N. Global Programme.
This Note examines the structure and goals of the Global
Programme and evaluates Nigeria'sparticipationin the project.
Part I provides a background analysis of corruption, the effects
of corruption, and Nigeria's efforts to curb corruption. Part III
analyzes the basic structure of the Programme, while Part IV
outlines Nigeria's efforts pursuant to the Global Programme.
Part V describes the areas upon which such a project needs to
focus in order to effectively target the evasive causes of
corruption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prayer for Nigeria in Distress
All powerful and merciful father, you are the God of justice, love and
peace. You rule over all the nations of the earth. Power and might are
in your hands, and no one can withstand you.
We present our country Nigeria before you. We praise and thank you,
for you are the source of all we are. We are sorry for all the sins we
have committed, and for good deeds we have failed to do. In your loving
forgiveness keep us safe from the punishment we deserve. Lord we are
weighed down not only by uncertainties, but also by moral, economic
and political problems.
Listen to the cries of your people who
confidently turn to you.
God of infinite goodness, our strength in adversity, our health in
weakness, our comfort in sorrow, be merciful to us your people, spare
this nation Nigeria from chaos, anarchy and doom.
Bless us with your kingdom of justice, love and peace.

1

Corruption is a detrimental force that hinders democracy and
represses individuals in many countries throughout the world. As
one Nigerian official noted, "there is corruption everywhere." 2 He
further explained that "[tihe word 'corruption' is not a Nigerian word;

1.
The Catholic National Episcopal Conference of Nigeria approved this
prayer. G. OKA OREWA, WE ARE ALL GUILTY: THE NIGERIAN CRISIS 208 (1997).
2.
BEDFORD N. UMEZ, THE TRAGEDY OF A VALUE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA:
THEORIES AND SOLUTIONS 49 (1999) (quoting a Nigerian official responding to a
question concerning Nigerian corruption posed by The Nigerian Foundation, Inc., and
Nigerians in Houston, Texas, Dec. 21, 1996).
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it is an English word."'3 While "corruption" is an English word,
necessarily laced with Western ideas, the concept behind corruption
is found in other cultures. In fact, over the past five years there is
Nigeria. 4
little doubt over which country is the most corrupt:
"Corruption, as the name rages like a desert storm blowing from the
North, has been institutionalized in Nigeria. '5 Nigeria possesses the
dubious honor as one of the world's most corrupt societies according
to Transparency International's Corrupt Practices Index. 6 In 2002,
Nigeria placed 101 out of the 102 nations where Transparency
International performed the study. 7 According to the organization's
index, which measures the "degree of corruption as seen by business
people, academics and risk analysts," only Bangladesh scored lower.8
Corrupt practices transcend nearly "every stratum of Nigerian
society."9 Thus, when seeking to mediate corruption, the Nigerian
government faces a trying task. While "corruption" is an English
word, it does not exist without equivalents in other languages. In
Nigeria one describes similar acts as okonjuwa, iri nso azu, or
zamba.10 Therefore, the concept of corruption and its perception as a
problem are certainly not foreign to Nigeria, in spite of what the
aforementioned official would lead one to believe.i 1 Major corruption
12
scandals have crippled Nigeria over the past several decades.
Between 1983 and 1999, the Nigerian government lost more than one
billion U.S. dollars annually to smuggling networks, many in

3.
Id.
4.
See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, at
http://www.transparency.orglpressreleases-archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html
[hereinafter
CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2002].
5.
Luke Ezekwem, Task Before Anti-Graft Commission, VANGUARD DAILY,
Jan. 15, 2001, at 1.
6.
Sonnie Ekwowusi, Curbing Corruption in Nigeria,THIS DAY, Oct. 15, 2000,
at 1. Transparency International is a non-governmental organization aimed at
producing more transparency in governmental transactions throughout the world. See
Transparency International, at http://www.transparency.org. Since 1996, Nigeria was
labeled the most corrupt nation three times-1996, 1997, and 2000-and placed in the
bottom five four more times-fourth from the bottom in 1998 and second in 1999, 2001,
and 2002. Ekwowusi, supra; CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2002, supra note 4.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. A description of the analysis used by Transparency International and
an explanation of how the survey is compiled may be found at the organization's
website. Transparency International, Background Paper to the 2002 Corruption
PerceptionsIndex, at http://www.transparency.orgcpi/2002/dnld/cpi2002/methodology.pdf.
9.
Ekwowusi, supra note 6.
10.
UMEZ, supra note 2, at 49.
11.
Id.
12.

OLADIMEJI ABORISADE & ROBERT J. MUNDT, POLITICS IN NIGERIA 199-200

(1998). During the Persian Gulf War when the country should have made enormous
profits from its petroleum industry, it actually experienced a loss caused by oil profits
skimming estimated at $12.6 billion. Id.
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collusion with the top elite of the nation. 13 The situation in Nigeria
provides a glimpse of how corruption can destroy an entire economy
in a developing nation.
As a result of the pervasive and devastating problem of thirdworld corruption, in 1998 the United Nations initiated a Global
14
Programme Against Corruption (Global Programme, Programme).
The Global Programme targets countries with vulnerable developing
or transitional economies by promoting anti-corruption measures and
helping to make public-sector actions more transparent. 15 This
program, initiated by the U.N. Center for International Crime
Prevention (CICP), 16 partners with countries where corruption is
prevalent to develop programs and legislation to minimize corrupt
17
practices.
This Note will examine the structure and goals of the Global
Programme and evaluate Nigeria's participation in the project. Part
II Will provide a background analysis of corruption, the effects of
corruption, and Nigeria's efforts to curb corruption. Part III will
analyze the basic structure of the Global Programme, while Part IV
will outline Nigeria's efforts pursuant to the Global Programme. Part
V will then describe the areas upon which such a project needs to
focus in order to effectively target the evasive causes of corruption.

II. BACKGROUND
This Section will (A) define and examine that which comprises
corruption, (B) provide a summary of the detrimental effects of
widespread corruption, (C) address Nigeria's colonial history and
examine the roots of the widespread graft, and (D) look at the current
levels of corruption during Nigeria's involvement with the U.N.
efforts to reduce corruption.

13.
Id. at 200. Moreover, the diversion of funds from the oil refineries led to a
major fuel shortage, which detrimentally affected other parts of the economy. Id.
14.
See U.N. Global Programme Against Corruption, at http://www.undcp.orgl
corruption.html.
15.
Id.
Id.
16.
17.
Id. Five countries currently take part in the program Hungary, Nigeria,
See United Nations, Country Projects, at
Romania, South Africa, and Uganda.
http://www.undcp.org/corruption-projects.html#summaries. Each nation's participation in
the program varies. As a result, the legislation enacted pursuant to the program's goals
differs greatly from nation to nation within the Global Programme Against Corruption. Id.
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A. CorruptionDefined
Before looking at the causes of Nigerian corruption and the new
measures sought by the United Nations and the Nigerian government
to remedy the problem, it is first necessary to define the term
"corruption."' 8 Formulating a definition remains vital because such
an omission would raise a practical dilemma: How can one examine
corruption and search for its solutions without first identifying what
is being studied? This difficulty arises in large part because defining
corruption can be, and has been, approached in numerous ways.
One definition formulated by Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell
provides a fairly accurate description of the term.1 9 They assert that
"a corrupt act violates responsibility towards at least one system of
public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of)
any such system. '20 They further clarify this description by adding
that "a public or civic order exalts common interest over special
interest; violations of common interest for special advantage are
'21
corrupt."
Like any definition, Rogow and Lasswell's is open to criticism.
One potential downfall is its broad, idealistic nature, but it is this
aspect that delves into the core of the nature of corruption. It
obviously cannot be considered a functional legal definition; therefore,
individual societies need to determine what levels of corruption are
tolerable. Generalized definitions are appropriate, especially when
trying to identify something as being right or wrong. When trying to
address corruption and remove it from society, however, it may be
necessary to find a more concrete, legal definition.
The United Nations formulated its own definition of the term
while developing an Anti-Corruption Tool Kit available to those
nations participating in the Global Programme, which is also
available to those not involved with the project that simply want to
evaluate and reduce their own levels of corruption. 22 The Tool Kit
23
does not take a specific, bright-line approach to defining corruption.
In it, the United Nations articulates that attempts to define the term
inevitably "encounter legal, criminological and... political issues. '24

18.
Defining corruption has been an impetus for discussion by many political
scientists attempting to examine this subject. See, e.g., ARNOLD A. ROGOW & HAROLD
D. LASSWELL, POWER, CORRUPTION & RECTITUDE 132 (1963).

19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
U.N. Global Programme Against Corruption, Anti-Corruption Tool Kit, at 3,
availableat http://www.odccp.org/pdf/crime/toolkit/fltof7.pdf.
23.
Id. at 6.
24.

Id.
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The Tool Kit, instead, defines differing types of corruption-grand,
25
petty, active, and passive.
Moreover, the Global Programme acknowledges that corruption
arises in many different forms. 26 The U.N.'s multi-layered definition
incorporates many concrete examples of how corruption manifests
itself.27 Nevertheless, their multiple definitions fail to do what
Rogow and Lasswell did-introduce the notion that one possesses a
responsibility to others while in office and appeal to how one violates
28
this responsibility when taking part in corrupt practices.
Therefore, a definition that combines the strengths from both the
Anti-Corruption Toolkit and Rogow and Laswell would provide a
broad, yet legally practicable, definition. Corruption could be defined
as a misuse of public authority for private gain, leading to the
violation of the civic responsibility inherent in such authority.2 9 Any
30
"violations of common interest for special advantage are corrupt.
The definition could further list those specific examples mentioned in
the Anti-Corruption Toolkit, but articulate that they are only
examples, as opposed to a comprehensive list.
B. Effects of Corruption
Corruption presents significant concerns, especially for
developing countries. Evidence suggests that corruption creates
major impediments to doing business in countries where it is
prevalent. 3 1
As a result, the effects on development can be
32
Furthermore, over the course of entire regimes headed
staggering.
by corrupt individuals, a nation could lose billions of dollars into the
pockets of the nation's leaders that would otherwise find outlets
elsewhere.3 3 Corruption exacerbates poverty and disproportionately
affects those of lower incomes because it pulls resources from the

25.

Id.

26.

See id.

Id. at 8. Some of the examples provided are bribery, fraud, theft, and
27.
embezzlement. Id.
28.
See ROGOW & LASSWELL, supra note 18, at 132.

29.

See id.

30.

Id.

31.

Omar Azfar et al., The Causes and Consequences of Corruption, 573

ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 47 (2001).

32.
Ernest Harsch, Africa Mounts Drive Against Graft: International AntiCorruption Conference Spotlights Global Malady, 13 AFRICA RECOVERY 1, 8 (1999). In
some instances a single scheme can cost a government millions of dollars. Id. Under
former dictatorships in Nigeria the amount siphoned off to foreign bank accounts is
estimated in the billions. Id.
33.
Id. Studies by the World Bank suggest that countries that suffer from
widespread corruption have economic growth rates that are .5% to 1% lower than they
otherwise would be. Id.
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national treasuries, placing the money into the bank accounts of a
few individuals who are politically powerful. 34 This type of corruption
exerts devastating effects on developing economies that desperately
need the money.
It
Corruption affects nations non-economically as well. 35
"debases human rights" and "destroys confidence in democracy and
the legitimacy of governments. '36 Some argue that it contributes to
South African Administer of
war and political instability. 37
corruption
and
Kader
Asmal,
believes
that
Education,
misadministration "undermine government in the eyes of the people.
They lead to a pervasive cynicism about politics and politicians,
which is disastrous for democracy." 38 Therefore, corruption destroys
a nation both economically and socially by deeply affecting the
economies of developing nations and by undermining what are often
already tenuous democratic institutions.
C. Nigerian History-the Roots of Corruption
Pre-Colonial Nigeria was comprised of numerous city-states,
empires, and kingdoms. 39 "[B]efore the advent of colonialism[,]
indigenous social and political structures were equally as diverse as
the many contemporary ethnic balances-language, genealogy,
religious beliefs or modes of survival. '40 Societies in the region
existed as such until the first Europeans made their way to West
Africa beginning with Ruy de Sequiers in 1472.41

34.
Id. Bedford Umez notes one major difference between corrupt officials in
Nigeria and those abroad. UMEZ, supra note 2, at 50. He articulates that the corrupt
officials in Nigeria siphon large sums of money out of Nigeria to bank accounts and
property abroad, removing the money from any use in the Nigerian economy. This
removes the money from its proper recipients, the people, not just once, but twice. Id.
Therefore, corruption forces individuals to pay bribes to cut through bureaucracy and
prevents foreign aid from reaching its targeted recipients. Id.
35.
See id.
36.
Id.
Id.
37.
38.
Id.
39.
JULIUS 0. IHONVBERE & TIMOTHY SHAW, ILLUSIONS OF POWER: NIGERIA IN
TRANSITION 1 (1998).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 7. The economic motive that encompassed the slave trade and
colonial rule would drastically change the course of Nigerian history, bringing
numerous cultures under colonial rule and leaving them united in a post-colonial State
rife with ethnic conflict and tensions. Id. "Whatever the several rationalizations
expressed in the literature as to why the Europeans visited the coast of West Africapolitical, strategic, religious and/or exploration-the major motive was economic." Id.
Eventually, abolitionists movements in the West made it necessary to replace the slave
trade with "legitimate trade." Id. at 9. The region provided an important center for
the extraction and exportation of palm oil. Id. This shift to the 'legitimate trade" of
palm oil "generated a steady change in the attitude of government officials and
businessmen towards the local rulers." Id.
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Modern Nigerian history began after the establishment of
"legitimate trade" when the British took over the port of Lagos in
1861, which was followed by the British claim of southern Nigeria
subsequent to the Berlin Conference in 1884-85.42 In the ensuing
decades, the focus of colonial rule shifted dramatically. Disputes
concerning the northern region of the country finally resolved
themselves by 1914 when the British asserted control over the entire
nation, subjecting it to colonial rule.4 3 Colonial rule did very little to
further the interests of the Nigerian people. 44
Consequently,
45
nationalist sentiment grew over the ensuing decades.
The nationalist movements culminated in the "Ten Year Plan for
Development and Welfare of Nigeria ' 46 and in a new Constitution in
1947, providing traditional rulers with slightly more input in national
governance. 47 Members of the nation's elite rejected the document,
leading to a new British-drafted Constitution in 1954 that divided
Nigeria into three regions-Eastern, Western, and Northern, plus
Lagos. 48
Despite this increased autonomy, on October 1, 1960
49
Nigeria gained independence.
Unfortunately, "regional, religious, and ethnic differences
plagued Nigeria from the outset. 5 0
Ethnic distrust severely
undermined the early years of the Nigerian state. 51 This was
52
exacerbated by the regional balance that proved largely inequitable.
Politics in the First Republic were characterized by widespread
corruption, largely focusing on nepotism based on ethnicity, region,
and religion. 53 Thus, roots of the current corruption in Nigeria

42.
History, KALEIDOSCOPE, Oct. 22, 2001, at 1.
43.
Id. This amalgamation of the region created the beginnings of the
movement for self-governance when it brought all of contemporary Nigeria together as
one unit. IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at 16. However, at the same time it
further stratified the society by creating a "new class of Nigerians--court clerks and
messengers, teachers, priests, doctors, journalists, administrators, lawyers, etc." Id.
In 1922 Britain established a colonial government, which included only a few African
representatives with virtually no authority. History, supra note 42, at 1.
44.

IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at 29.

45.

History, supra note 42, at 1.

46.

IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at 29.

47.
History, supra note 42, at 1.
48.
Id. This document gave each region the option of internal self-governance,
a step which all three took by 1959. Id.
49.
IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at 30. "In sum, Nigeria achieved
political independences in 1960 severely underdeveloped and dependent." Id.
50.
History, supra note 42, at 1.
51.
IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at 30.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 32.
Public officials demonstrated what would later become a
recurring theme of accumulating massive amounts of wealth and searching for private
gain at the expense of the public at large. Id.
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extend back decades, finding a home in every regime in the country's
54
modern history.
In January 1966, officers from the Ibo ethnic group overthrew
the government, establishing military rule that persisted in some
form or another over the next two and one half decades.5 5 Since 1966,
seven different military regimes have exercised power over Nigeria,
with a brief respite of civilian rule from 1979-83.56
Corruption
marred each passing regime, however, with the decades of corrupt
rule culminating in the seizure of power by General Sani Abacha in
1993. 57 Abacha suspended the Constitution and tried to suppress
58
pro-democracy movements.
Nevertheless, a significant shift in power occurred in 1998 when
Abacha died. His successor, General Abdulsalam Abubaker, pushed
the country towards democracy and a new beginning by removing
restrictions to political parties and transitioning into democratic
elections.5 9 In 1999, Nigeria held elections and Olusegun Obasanjo
became the state's new political leader.6 0 As a result, Nigeria's
current institutional framework often mirrors that of many other
61
democratic republics around the globe.
Nigeria's colonial influence, coupled with its preexisting legal
structures, however, creates a diverse and complex legal system.6 2 In

54.
John Erero & Tony Oladoyin, Tackling the Corruption Epidemic in Nigeria,
in CORRUPTION & DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES
282-84 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikale eds., 2000). Even though
subsequent military rulers cited corruption among reasons for overthrowing past
regimes, corruption persisted under the new regimes. Id. at 282.
55.
History, supra note 42, at 1.
56.
IHONVBERE & SHAW, supra note 39, at xxii.
57.
Erero & Oladoyin, supra note 54, at 282. Corruption was rampant during
the first two military regimes following civilian rule, with Generals Aguiyi-Ironsi and
Gowon doing nothing to combat the problem. Id.
58.
Government, KALEIDOSCOPE, Oct. 22, 2001, 1. During his five years of rule,
which ended with his death in 1998, Abacha is believed to have embezzled billions of
dollars from the Nigerian government. History, supra note 42, at 2. He sentenced
those who opposed the regime to long prison terms and executed numerous national
leaders who spoke out against the regime. Id.
59.
Id.
60.
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Nigeria Project, at http://www.unodc.org/
odccp/corruption-projects-nigeria.html. This shift has the potential to significantly
impact the future of Nigeria and its reputation for corruption and most likely provided
the transition necessary to allow for Nigeria's cooperation with the Global Programme
Against Corruption. Also, the move was facilitated by the fact that President Obasanjo
"has demonstrated the political will to tackle corruption ....
Id.
61.
Government, supra note 58, at 1. Nigeria is governed by a written
Constitution signed into law on May 5, 1999. Id. The Constitution frames the nation
in a federal republic with a significant portion of power divested among the country's
36 states. Id.
62.
NONSO OKEREAFOEZEKE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN POST-BRITISH NIGERIA:
CONFLICTS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NATIVE AND FOREIGN SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL

CONTROL IN IGBO 11 (2002).
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many parts of the country, the legal framework in place prior to the
colonial presence stands alongside the British common law imported
during colonialism. 6 3 Because of the competing legal systems and
philosophies that exist and interact in many parts of Nigeria, it is
necessary to understand how the Nigerian legal framework interacts
to better understand how anti-corruption legislation could be
implemented.6 4 For example, in the Igbo region of southeastern
Nigeria, the English justice system is the dominant system and is
supported by government enforcement. 65 This system coexists with
the native justice systems, however, which may be more widely used,
especially with respect to the management of the society's grievances
in
and disputes. 66 As a result, it is necessary to keep this dichotomy
67
mind when examining official governmental policies in Nigeria.
Major problems have emerged as a byproduct of this pluralistic
system of justice. 68 One major concern is that the average Nigerian
does not understand the competing systems of justice. 69 Moreover,
evidence suggests that when the two systems conflict citizens are not
inclined to choose the British system "because its origin, history,
experiences, and contextual roots differ from those of most
Nigerians." 70 Still, the "repugnancy test," a policy that has been in
place in Nigeria since 1900, subordinates native law to the British
71
common-law system.
D. Nigeria and the Global Programme
Upon election in 1999, President Obasanjo placed anti-corruption
initiatives at the top of his political agenda. 72 'Much of the Nigerian
government's initial work in fighting corruption has addressed the
Through
legacy of former dictator General Sani Abacha. '' 73
Obasanjo's work Nigeria has moved forward in its initiatives
74
pursuant to the CICP's Global Programme Against Corruption.
Implementation, however, has not been an easy process. "While

63.
Id. at 12.
64.
'See generally id. (describing the importance of understanding complexities
of legal, political, and economic legacies of Nigerian history to policy-making for today).
65.
Id. at 11-12.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
Id.
68.
69.
Id.
Id.
70.
71.
Id. at 161.
72.

UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 82 (2001), available at

http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2O0l.shtml#download.
Id.
73.
74.
See id.
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[Obasanjo] has pushed his reform programme forward, the pace of
change has been slow, which was perhaps inevitable in a country
where corruption is so deeply embedded. '75 For example, Nigeria's
Anti-Corruption Law took more than one year to pass through the
legislature. 76 Moreover, it is questionable if this legislation will in
fact provide meaningful progress toward a sustainable democracy and
77
economy with reduced corruption.
Some skeptics question how effective legislation will be in
resolving Nigerian corruption because the changes that need to be
adopted are sweeping, including "getting justice done . . . without
spending money, giving fair trial to cases and accused persons in
court .... getting things done in government without bribing relevant
authorities, [and] getting big contracts without the usual 10%
settlement .... ,"78 Some openly wonder whether this country, which
endured many years of repressive colonial rule, is capable of
embracing a non-corrupt democratic society. 79
"Endowed with
abundant natural resources and a rich cultural history, Nigeria
gained independence in the modern era only to endure years of
tyranny under successive military governments known for their
corruption and ruthlessness."8 0
Indeed, corruption still reigns in Nigeria and throughout its
West African neighbors. Transparency International published its
first Global Corruption Report in 2001.81
Though the Report
indicates that widespread corruption persists throughout the country
and surrounding region, it provides hope that recent efforts may work
to ameliorate the situation.8 2
The Report indicates that the
government is strengthening mechanisms for accountability.8 3 While
many of the reforms consist primarily of public relations moves, anticorruption campaigns, public sector reforms, privatization, and
transparency initiatives also have made their way onto political
agendas.8 4 At the very least, these measures deserve evaluation to
determine whether they will prove successful in providing some
accountability to public offices in Nigeria.

75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Here, Corruption is King, AFRICA NEWS, July 9, 2001, at 1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
78.
Luke Ezekwem, Task Before Anti-Graft Commission, VANGUARD DAILY, Jan.
15, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
79.
Here, Corruptionis King, supra note 77, at 1.
80.
History, supra note 42, at 1.
81.
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT, supra note 72, at 1-2.
82.
Id. at 93.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.

1008

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36..997

III. U.N. GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST CORRUPTION
This section will (A) provide the general framework, (B) basic
structure, and (C) goals of the U.N. Global Programme.

A. Background of the U.N. Involvement
"Corruption is a major social and economic issue. And the
world's tolerance of it is fading fast. '8 5 Realizing that corruption is a
problem with international implications, the United Nations has
made efforts to combat it.
Because the economic and social
implications affect numerous nations, the Global Programme could
develop into a much larger project depending on the successes and
failures of its 13 pilot nations.8 6 The U.N. Global Programme stands
as a joint venture between the U.N.'s Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention (UNDCCP) and the government of the state
seeking to eliminate corruption.8 7 The goal of this program is to
"prevent, detect and fight corruption," along with promoting
"integrity, transparency, accountability and the rule of law. 88 More
specifically, it attempts to "build integrity in order to curb and
prevent corruption by increasing the risks and costs of abusing power
'8 9
for private gain.
Political analysts indicate that Hungary possesses the best
chance of success in such a program. 90 Still, the Global Programme
currently boasts participation by 5 other nations, while hoping to
expand to include all 13 pilot countries in the near future. 91 The
current list of nations involved comprises four nations from AfricaBenin, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda-and two from Eastern
Europe-Hungary and Romania. 92 While these countries form the
initial step in this massive project, it appears that still more nations
could benefit from the Programme and may be added later to its

85.
U.N. Global Programme Against Corruption, U.N. Crime and Justice
Information Network, available at http://www.uncjin.org/CICP/Folder/corr.htm
(quoting Pino Arlacchi, executive director for the U.N. Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention).
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ranks. 93 In establishing the project, the United Nations ultimately
hopes to work with 13 member countries in 5 regions-Africa, the
Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia-for its pilot
94
program.
By November 2003, the project seeks to "implement, evaluate
and disseminate" the Programme in Hungary, Lebanon, Nicaragua,
Uganda, South Africa, Indonesia, Benin, Zimbabwe, Macedonia,
Tajikistan, Nigeria, Guatemala, and Bolivia. 95
In doing so it
anticipates funding from numerous areas, including the private
sector and bilateral donor agencies. 96 The Netherlands, France, and
the United States play significant roles in funding the project's
modest cost of implementation of USD $6 million during the startup
97
phase.
B. Policies and Approaches Adopted by the U.N. Global Programme
The U.N. Global Programme aims to build from the pilot projects
that it establishes and learn from the successes and failures of those
countries taking the first steps in combating corruption through an
integrated U.N. effort. 98 The United Nations has worked to develop
anti-corruption tool kits and hold forums to discuss the difficulties
inherent in such a process. 99 As a result, the United Nations is
working to develop an integrated approach that is based upon "six
pillars": (1) democratic reform, (2) a strong civil society with a
mandate to monitor the state, (3) the rule of law, (4) a system of
checks and balances, (5) partnerships facilitating advocacy of the
implementation of anti-corruption policies, and (6) partnerships
facilitating the development strategies for the implementation of
anti-corruption policies.10 0
The policies underlying the Programme stress the importance of
several factors for the future success of the project.10 1 The Global
Programme seeks to include as many individuals as possible to
successfully reduce corruption, ranging from government officials to
academics to the public. 10 2 While the extent to which the Programme

93.
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will actually use the input of the poorest and most marginalized
citizens remains to be seen, on its face the project purports to address
the concerns of those citizens. 10 3 Moreover, the Programme seeks to
remain evidence-based, non-partisan, and transparent.104
The comprehensive nature of the Programme, however, is
probably its most ambitious aspect. Understanding that corruption is
present in many areas, the project accordingly looks to address each
area. 10 5 Therefore, policy underlying the Global Programme favors
the development of an extremely broad-based approach aimed at
examining and combating corruption at a variety of levels.
C. Structure of the Global Programme
This Programme is aimed at being a more long-term
commitment by the United Nations to fight corruption-estimates of
how long it will take to attain sustainable results appear to require
nearly a decade of cooperation between the United Nations and the
state involved. 10 6 As a result, the focus of the Programme does not
center upon short-term relief efforts, but rather looks to provide
sustainable results through a myriad of programs, including
providing model legislation and helping to make government more
10 7
transparent in its practices.
The Programme will advise governments on drafting and revising
relevant legislation and provide training for all "stakeholder" groupsincluding local authorities, business councils, grassroots organizations
and ordinary citizens--on newly introduced anti-corruption measures.
It will also develop public awareness campaigns, codes of conduct, a
credible public complaints system and encourage the declaration and
10 8
monitoring of assets and an increased access to information.

Central to the Programme's functioning is the monitoring system
it hopes to establish.' 0 9 The Global Trends Study examines the
efficacy of anti-corruption levels not only by examining the levels
themselves, but also by researching public sentiment regarding how
ordinary citizens judge the effectiveness of the policies pursued. 110
The study attempts to do this using a variety of means. First, the
Global Trends Study conducts a comprehensive Country Assessment
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for each of the pilot project nations. 11 It also conducts research in
conjunction with non-pilot nations to develop regional assessments
concerning corruption. 112
Moreover, the Global Trends Study
113
conducts regional surveys by non-governmental organizations.
The Global Programme cannot function, however, without
assistance from the governments of the pilot states. Each country
identified corruption as a problem within its borders and requested
this assistance from the United Nations." 4 In addition, each has
agreed to expend considerable resources in pursuance of the goal. 1 5
For example, each nation establishes an independent institution to
oversee and implement the National Integrity Strategy and an AntiCorruption Action Plan. 116
They conduct independent country
assessments, disseminate information from the surveys, and "monitor
the impact of the anti-corruption programme in a transparent
117
manner."
The basic structure of the program is as follows: "The Global
Programme is composed of three main parts: (1) the action research
(learning by doing) component, (2) the technical cooperation
component and (3) the monitoring and evaluation component.""l 8
Moreover, "The Programme will take place at (1) the international
level, (2) the national and at (3) the subnational or municipal
level." 119 All of these levels work together to maximize the success of
the program as a whole.
The action-research component is a self-evaluating mechanism to
learn from the successes and failures of the project. 120 It evaluates
the efficacy of the implementing project and the Programme itself,
the donor, and the executing agency. 1 1 "Through this systematic
learning process the most successful tools will be identified by the
monitoring and evaluation process and refined, while less successful
or promising tools might be modified or eliminated."'12 2
The technical cooperation component ensures that the program
maintains a balance between preventative measures and
enforcement. 123 The technical cooperation is provided at all three
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levels-international,
national,
and
subnational. 124
The
international level involves promoting the creation of transparency
and the adoption of a coherent strategy to fight corruption. 12 5 The
national level involves assessment of existing measures fighting
corruption, providing advice concerning strengthening legislation and
anti-corruption bodies, and offering training at that level. 126 At the
subnational level, the technical support provided by the United
Nations encompasses evaluation of existing measures and aid in
127
implementation of the newly-adopted anti-corruption measures.
The monitoring and evaluation component of the Global
Programme is undertaken by the U.N. Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) with the assistance of an
international expert group. 128 It provides an independent source of
monitoring in all of the pilot countries. 129
UNICRI evaluates
130
corruption in public administration, business, politics, and finance.
The results are available through databases available on UNICRI
and the Centre for International Crime Prevention's (CICP)
websites. 13 1 Moreover, the results are also disseminated in meetings
132
with member countries and in U.N. documents.
The United Nations implements the entire program, working
closely with the International Steering Committee. 133 These two
groups coordinate the numerous international and governmental
organizations involved in this sweeping project. 134 They hope to
create a "forum to share information and experiences from the CICP's
'135
13 pilot projects and to discuss future measures.
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IV. NIGERIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND INITIATIVES
The fourth portion of this Note will delve into Nigeria's legal
framework and initiatives by examining four areas-(A) legal
framework prior to Nigeria's involvement in the Global Programme,
(B) legislation and initiatives developed pursuant to the Programme,
(C) successes of the recent legislation, and (D) potential future
legislation.
A. Existing Legal Framework
It is necessary to note that Nigeria did not enter the Programme
without a legislative means already in place to combat corruption or a
broadly-defined legal framework to provide for justice against corrupt
practices. 136 Prior to Nigeria's involvement in the CICP's Global
Programme, the state did possess legal means to decrease levels of
corruption. 137 These measures failed to reduce corruption in any
meaningful way, and Nigeria proceeded to the top of Transparency
International's Corrupt Practices Index despite the aims of both the
Criminal Code (1990) and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal
Act. 138 These statutes possessed strong anti-corruption features, and
139
the Constitution also provided for protection of individual liberties.
The preamble to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution demonstrates
The
the sweeping aims of the country's system of justice. 140
Constitution aims to promote "good government and welfare of all
persons in .

.

. [Nigeria], on the principles of freedom, equality and

justice ....
"141
The 1999 Constitution also provides a means for
connecting the state's goals to an institutional framework. 142 Section
14.1 proclaims that the "Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State
based on the principles of democracy and social justice.' 1 43 Moreover,
the Constitution places the "security and welfare" of the people and
144
notions of democracy at its heart.
The language of the Nigerian Constitution also places a premium
on the integrity of public officials by providing the language for the
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oaths offered by the President and the judiciary. 145 The oath of office
of the President speaks of discharging the duty in a manner that
does not permit "personal interest to influence [the President's]
official conduct or official decisions. ' 14 6 Also, the judicial oath
references similar goals by providing that the position will be
147
performed honestly and in accordance with the laws of Nigeria.
While the Constitution provides no means for attaching criminal
sanctions for noncompliance with these oaths of office, it does
establish a rhetoric promoting the ideals of a just and equitable state.
The institutional protections of individual rights against corrupt
practices existing prior to the U.N. Global Programme do not end
with the 1999 Constitution. Section 98 of the Criminal Code, for
example, proscribed persons from giving, or promising to give,
payment to a public official in order to obtain "contract, license or
permit" or face a seven-year prison sentence. 148 While this measure
addressed only individuals offering bribes and did not allow for
redress against the persons forcing the use of payments, it
149
nonetheless provided some measure to combat corruption.
Moreover, the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act
supplied a more stringent standard, also designed to punish
individuals offering bribes. This Act moved further by prohibiting
such payments to induce a public official to do her duty. 150 The Act
contained a loophole, however, by providing that a public official may
receive gifts from relatives and personal friends to the extent allowed
by custom. 151 In a state where bribery is commonplace, it is not
difficult to imagine that many gifts could be considered "customary."
Nevertheless, Nigeria has not been devoid of the framework needed to
combat corruption, and the state did not initiate its efforts pursuant
to the Global Programme without existing legislation designed to
target at least some levels of corruption.
B. Implementation of Initiatives Pursuantto the Global Programme
Against Corruption
Nigeria has implemented a significant framework in pursuance
of the U.N.'s Global Programme. 152 In June 2000, the Nigerian
legislature passed the Anti-Corruption Law, which stands as the

145.
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most significant step achieved thus far in pursuance of the
Programme's institutional goals.' 53
The Anti-Corruption law
established the Anti-Corruption Commission as its independent
institution to monitor and implement its plans, and numerous
initiatives have been pursued.' 54 Most significantly, the CICP is
currently working with Chief Justice M. L. Uwais and Justice A. 0.
Obaseki, Administrator of the National Judicial Institute, to improve
the integrity of Nigeria's judiciary in order to effectively implement
55
anti-corruption legislation.'
The "Corruption and Organized Crime: Challenges for a New
Millennium" Conference (Conference) was held May 7-11, 2000 in
Abuja, Nigeria. 156
There, experts, public officials, and citizens
discussed corruption and formulated a 17-point action plan designed
specifically to combat Nigerian corruption. 157
The Nigerian
government organized the Conference in conjunction with the U.N.
Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention. 158 This Conference
focused specifically on Nigeria and how the government and its
citizens could best focus anti-corruption efforts. 159 Topics included
defining corruption, evaluating its relation to globalization, and
examining strategies for implementation
of anti-corruption
legislation.' 60 Furthermore, those persons in attendance helped to
formulate recommendations for future action pursuant to the Global
61
Programme.'
The recommendations varied greatly with respect to subject and
specificity. Among the more ambiguous in terms of implementation,
the Conference suggested raising public awareness, avoiding
politicization of the Anti-Corruption commission, and leading
Nigeria's youth away from "crime and cultism" to more constructive
ends. 16 2
Still, many specific recommendations flowed from the
gathering. Re-screening public officials to purge offices of corrupt
officials, increasing access to public information, establishing special
anti-corruption courts, and providing for electronic monitoring in the
Central Bank and the Securities and Exchange Commission
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While
the
the
conference's
resolutions. 163
highlighted
recommendations were just that and did not possess the effect of law,
the event helped to refocus Nigerian efforts by recognizing that
laws
corruption renders negative impacts and that Nigeria's current
164
and institutions could not adequately remedy the situation.
The Anti-Corruption Law rests at the center of Nigeria's
implementation of the U.N. Global Programme. The law criminalizes
many facets of corruption by defining the offense broadly: "fraud,
bribery, extortion, hoarding, smuggling, ... influence peddling, illegal
custody of public records or documents, and preferential dispensation
of patronage. ' 165 Moreover, the Anti-Corruption Law applies to both
Nigerian citizens and foreign citizens residing in Nigeria who commit
offenses both in Nigeria and abroad by criminalizing corrupt practices
that already took place, as opposed to preventing acts from
occurring. 166 Prosecution of already-committed transgressions would
hopefully prevent future crimes from taking place.
The most important aspect of the Anti-Corruption Law is that it
does not provide immunity from prosecution to anyone, not even the
President. 167 By attempting to prevent bribery and corruption at all
levels, the law applies to every Nigerian. 168 The law apparently
conflicts with provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, however,
drafted during the previous military regime and enacted under the
current democracy, that grant immunity to the President, Vice
President, and governors while they are in office. 169 Therefore, it is
unlikely with enforcement against one of those individuals that the
Act could withstand a constitutional challenge.
Subsequent to the Anti-Corruption Law's enactment in 2000, the
Nigerian government moved forward by providing for better
enforcement of the legislation. In September 2001, the government
approved the establishment of anti-corruption units in all federal
The units "operate with full
ministries and state agencies.' 7 0
autonomy monitoring adherence to all transparency codes stipulated
by the anti-corruption law. . . ." Furthermore, the government
established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related
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Offenses Commission when it enacted the Anti-Corruption Law. 171
The Commission investigates corruption, brings charges concerning
1 72
allegations, and prosecutes those cases.
Unfortunately, not all of President Obasanjo's legislation has
met with success, and the Nigerian legislature has threatened repeal
of the Anti-Corruption Law, the centerpiece of Nigeria's anticorruption measures. 173 The upper house of parliament has already
voted to overturn the legislation, while the lower house continues to
debate its removal. 174
Legislators cite use of anti-corruption
legislation against opposition to the regime as a factor in pushing for
repeal. 175 Specifically, they argue for taking the power to appoint
members to the Anti-Corruption Commission out of the President's
176
hands.
Moreover, in the years preceding and following the Conference,
many anti-corruption initiatives have met considerable resistance or
found their ultimate demise in the legislature. 1 77 This has not
prevented the President from continuing to support the already178
enacted legislation and further measures as well.
Another key aspect of the Nigerian project, and the Programme
generally, centers around the judiciary. 179 Without measures to curb
corruption in the judiciary, the project would be meaningless because
the institutional and legal framework would exist devoid of a means
of effective enforcement.' 80 As a result, the Global Programme
provides for methods of ridding the judiciary of corruption, including
designing approaches to achieve better judicial control, defining
accountability within the judiciary, facilitating the process, and
raising awareness publicly of the amount of judicial corruption. l 8 '
Chief Justice Uwais participated in the anti-corruption efforts
and has worked to provide for a less-corrupt judiciary.' 8 2 For
example, Uwais participated in a workshop in April 2000 that
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addressed the topic of strengthening integrity in the judiciary.18 3 In
addition, Uwais and members of the judiciary of seven other African
18 4
and Asian nations met to create a pilot project for judicial reform.
They discussed judicial corruption, public perception of it, its
l85
indicators and causes, and processes for remediation.
Pursuant to the two-day meeting, the participants provided
numerous recommendations to their respective legislatures. They
suggested action concerning a variety of issues-data collection,
remuneration, monitoring, revision or establishment of codes of
conduct, transparency, computerization of records, providing peer
pressure, and involving bar associations, to name a few.' 8 6 While the
topic of the conversations and recommendations may result in no
immediate change legislatively in Nigeria, Uwais' presence at the
conference undoubtedly established support for the measures sought
by President Obasanjo and aided in the increased visibility of
Nigeria's anti-corruption project.
C. Successes of Recent Nigerian Efforts
Two high profile prosecutions under the Anti-Corruption Law
demonstrate that the law possesses at least some teeth and that
authorities can prosecute in a meaningful manner.1 8 7 In May 2001,
the first charges were brought under the recently-enacted law against
a member of a presidentially-appointed panel to investigate the staterun airline, Nigeria Airways.' 88 The official was accused of receiving
3.5 million naira, or USD $30,000, in order to influence the outcome
l8 9
of the panel's decision.
The success of the government's efforts against corruption moved
forward a second time when a sitting judge, Justice Garba Abdullahi,
was arraigned on charges of bribery in the course of judicial duties by
the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission.'9 " Whether this is a
trend indicative of prosecutions yet to come or whether the recent
cases are simply an empty display with no enforcement, remains
unclear. Nevertheless, these cases clearly provide the critical initial
step toward the enforcement of the Anti-Corruption Law and the
furthering of Nigeria's efforts pursuant to the Programme.
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D. Model LegislationProposed by the United Nations
While Nigerian efforts to curb corruption move forward, both
with signs of progress and with great setbacks, we should remember
that the Nigerian Project has only existed for three years.' 9 1 If
meaningful, sustainable progress hopes to advance from this
endeavor, further legislation is in need of implementation. Part of
the Global Programme involves developing anti-corruption legislation
proposals. 192 This proposed legislation provides a glimpse of what
one may expect of future Nigerian legislation. These proposals are
found in the Anti-Corruption Tool Kit and touch upon numerous
topics.' 93
For example, one suggestion involves regulating financial
institutions to enable governments to create transparency and
prevent money laundering. 194 By creating a paper trail, it is far more
difficult for public officials to hide and launder the money obtained
through bribery. 195 Revised regulations in the financial sector would
help target the most egregious cases of corruption. 19 6
Also,
broadening the scope of this legislation beyond that of financial
institutions to other businesses would greatly expand the benefit of
197
money laundering laws.
Proposed anti-corruption laws also focus on the revision of
corporate law. 198
Again, this proposal focuses on institutional
transparency and suggests allowing the identification of corporate
beneficiaries. 199
This suggestion, however, overlaps with the
proposed financial sector regulation and is, admittedly, unnecessary
in light of other proposals and other international standards already
20 0
in place.
Other proposals are directed at procedural, rather than
substantive, law. 201 Increasing the significance of circumstantial
evidence in corruption cases may provide for more effective
prosecution of anti-corruption measures. 20 2 At the same time, it could
also result in misuse of anti-corruption laws by allowing for political
paybacks. With the increase in complexity of bribe techniques, such a
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tool would aid in all aspects of the prosecution-from investigation to
conviction. 20 3 Other legislatures have achieved this result through
numerous means, but central to them all is a focus on the results of
the criminal act, rather than the practice itself.20 4 One means of
achieving this involves criminalizing and confiscating inexplicable
205
wealth.
A final provision in the proposed legislation provided by the
United Nations involves protection for whistleblowers, the purpose of
which is to facilitate the reporting of crimes and safeguard against
reprisal of those who make reports of corruption. 20 6 This legislation
would allow those who are in the best position to know about the
20 7
practices, but are too frightened to report them, to come forward.
The proposal explains what is needed for an effective whistleblower
statute-prevention
against victimization, deterrence against
retaliatory action, compensation for those victimized, coordination
with other employment laws, explanation of to whom to address the
information, and clear implementation. 20 8 The proposed legislation
also advocates laws deterring false allegations to prevent the false
20 9
and malicious use of whistleblower protections.
Also, the United Nations frequently revises model legislation and
attempts to further the goals of the Global Programme by reassessing
what is and is not working within the individual country projects.
Most recently, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a
Convention against Corruption met in Vienna from January 21
through February 1, 2002.210 The Committee addressed legislative
concerns, but instead of providing proposal-oriented legislation, it
drafted actual legislation that individual legislatures could fully
21 1
implement.
The model legislation merged draft legislation submitted by
various governments into one organized piece of legislation covering
all of the provisions of a criminal statute concerning corruption:
"criminalization, sanctions and remedies, confiscation and seizure,
jurisdiction, liability of legal persons, protection of witnesses and
victims and law enforcement. ''2 12
This legislation goes beyond
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previous model legislation by providing states with a substantive
guide to erect their own anti-corruption measures.

V. EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME AND NIGERIA'S IMPLEMENTATION

Part V of this Note will examine the reasons why the U.N. Global
Programme will not result in complete success without significant
revision. It will examine the causes of corruption and how the Global
Programme fails to address them all. This Part will then discuss the
lack of adequate incentives supplied by the Global Programme and
conclude with an analysis of the overwhelming cost of remediating
the actual causes of corruption.
The Global Programme appears to have provided some successes.
Groundbreaking legislation geared specifically toward the reduction
of corruption has been passed. 213 Nevertheless, it is difficult to assert
that corruption has actually decreased with the introduction of the
recent anti-corruption measures. 214 Nigeria is firmly entrenched at
the bottom of Transparency International's Corrupt Practices Index,
and it does not appear that there will be a significant shift any time
215
in the near future.
A. Failureto Address the Causes of Corruption
There are numerous hypotheses concerning why such measures
cannot be successful. Upon further elucidation of Nigerian history,
the origins of corruption in Nigeria are identifiable in a cultural
context. The high levels of corruption that have infiltrated both the
public and private sectors are not caused by the institutions
themselves. Political leaders have exploited conditions and broken
down the democratic system that would otherwise limit the extent of
these troubling conditions.
Moreover, as history explicates,
corruption has pervaded the upper-echelons of Nigerian society for
many decades and through nearly a dozen different regimes.
Undoubtedly, the current institutional framework works to combat
corruption on some level, but as some political scientists argue, the
216
terminal point is cultural.
One scholar illustrates this cultural argument by likening
corruption to a house infested with termites,
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The structure of the dwelling conditions the life of the occupants, but
the occupants can change the structure if they wish. If the structure
begins to leak and all the occupants resign themselves to it, blaming it
on the structure, the structure will continue to leak. In this case the
explanation still lies with the occupants who do not wish to repair the
structure. Something non-human cannot be held responsible for
something human. The structuralist explanation for corruption shifts
the focus of responsibility from the human actor to factors external to
the actor. These external factors are significant in understanding the
extent and manifestation of the phenomenon, but they are not the
terminal point of the explanation. The terminal point is the nature of
217
man.

Robert Putnam also elucidated the belief that corruption may not
be a structural dilemma. 218 In his work, Putman explores the true
causes of anti-democratic ideals by performing an empirical study of
the levels of anti-democratic sentiment and amount of civic reliance
in different portions of modern Italy. 2 19 His studies found that while
northern and southern Italy possess similar institutional structures,
civic traditions and affinities for traditions rank much lower in the
south than in the north.220 He concludes that institutional success
does not lie merely in the institutions themselves, but in the
communities' ability to rely on those institutions and the faith they
will place in political structures, which can vary greatly even within
the same country. 221 As a result, southern Italy faces greater
the
difficulties in combating corruption and promoting the use of
222
political institutions in place to establish an effective democracy.
Putnam's studies of Italian political institutions provide a
background with which to study legal and political structures
throughout the world. His findings present a significant dilemma for
projects like the Global Programme. Under such an analysis, merely
creating a legal structure to combat a problem with causal roots at a
much more social level will inevitably prove ineffective. Creating
model laws encouraging transparency and forcing cooperation by the
judiciary and law enforcement officials will not achieve the desired
results if the legal framework does not target the root of corruptionthe cultural framework which has been eroded by decades of colonial
and military rule.
While laws can provide an effective means of ordering a society,
they cannot provide all of the answers to remedying a society.
Bedford Umez recognized the "systemic root of the leadership
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217.
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corruption, namely, the prevailing Nigerian value system (which
glorifies and endorses corrupt and illegal behaviors and actions as
necessary means to ends). ' 22 3 It is possible that corruption has
embedded itself in the fabric of Nigerian society, and policies have to
be adopted to target the social aspects of widespread corruption.
Perhaps Nigeria is "a nation founded by imperialist fraudulence, a
country established by colonialist fiat with the sole aim of exploiting
its natural and human resources . . .[a place where] dishonesty has
germinated, grown, and metamorphosed into a giant tree of
2 24
corruption .... "
This factor will play a significant role in the shortcomings of the
U.N. efforts.
The United Nations itself admits the causes of
corruption vary from one state to the next.2 25
This variance
complicates the matter further and necessitates extremely tailored
research and policies concerning each state. Thus, even if effective
results are achieved in some of the pilot programs, it is not clear
whether those positive results could be used to formulate a general
guide to fight corruption.
Furthermore, if the corruption is a cultural problem, providing
institutional frameworks to combat the problem will do little to
redress it. Laws that carry no force and have no support at a broad
level will fail to do more than provide a superficial remedy for a much
deeper problem.
One cannot redress cultural ailments with a
structural remedy. Instead, the United Nations needs to provide
more significant training and educational tools to combat the
problem. Only when the Programme specifically addresses Nigerian
culture can the laws being adopted meet an effective end.
When corruption is as pervasive in a society as it is in Nigeria,
more efforts should be directed at developing an understanding of
how the Nigerian culture understands corruption.
Moreover,
individuals need to understand that corruption has negative effects
beyond the punishment that the state exacts for a violation of an anticorruption law. For Nigeria's efforts truly to be effective in the longterm, more attention should focus on helping people to understand
that engaging in corrupt practices violates a deeper sense of right
versus wrong. Therefore, the Global Programme may provide a
sufficient institutional framework to deal with corruption. If the
causes of corruption are rooted more at a specific cultural level,
however, then the Programme will prove completely ineffective. One
only needs to look at the Obasanjo regime to elucidate such a
hypothesis. No amount of legislation and proposed legislation will
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render effective results in combating corruption if most of the
government officials refuse to remediate their behavior. As such,
initiatives need to be aimed at addressing cultural ideas that
perpetuate corrupt practices, rather than patching the problem with
a structural remedy that fails to address the cause.
B. Failureto Provide Effective Incentives to Comply with the
Programme'sMeasures
The Global Programme could be furthered through other, more
external, means even if measures are not fully targeted at the roots of
corruption. The most significant problem for combating corruption in
Nigeria is the pervasiveness of the problem. There are areas that
such a project will have difficulty redressing. For example, only six
countries have joined the Programme, which speaks to concerns
regarding countries where corruption invades even the uppermost
levels of government. Such a solution will not be effective because it
requires the full cooperation of the states involved.
Nigeria
consistently faces the problem of corrupt law enforcement officials
and corrupt practices in the judiciary. Thus, the Programme needs
more significant external measures for forcing compliance at the
upper-most levels of government.
In an article entitled Curbing Corruption in Nigeria, Sonnie
Ekwowusi elucidates questions of legitimacy that surround a regime
that comes to power in such a corrupt environment. 226 She pointedly
articulates that "[a] government that bulldozed itself to power
through corruption cannot suddenly metamorphose into an anticorruption crusader. ''227 Ekwowusi develops the idea that in some
places corruption does not simply isolate itself to private individuals
bribing those in the public sector. 228 When the upper-most public
officials are the ones doing the bribing to win elections or when they
are embezzling billions of dollars, the problem of eradicating
229
corruption becomes much more complicated.
In Nigeria, corruption persists despite the efforts of Global
Programme. 230 Aborisade and Mundt lament that no regime has
effectively combated corruption, including the current one.2 31 They
criticize President Obasanjo's efforts to present anticorruption
legislation, but acknowledge that the National Assembly prevented
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the positive effects that the President sought. 23 2 They note that
"[t]his nation's legislative body has been tainted with charges of
bribery and misappropriation of funds from the first days of its
existence .... ,,233 A select few well-intentioned politicians cannot
hope to reform an entire nation.
Therefore, strongly relying on the use of legislation and
individual efforts by the nations is not enough. The international
community needs to exert pressure on these regimes to limit
corruption by, for example, better monitoring the foreign aid
traveling to countries like Nigeria. If the states around the world, the
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund combined to
threaten to withhold aid unless noticeable effects result from anticorruption measures, then it would provide more incentives for
Member Nations. This change in incentives could force countries to
comply by making it much more costly to continue corrupt practices.
C. Costs of Remediation
The cultural analysis of this dilemma also raises significant
issues of cost. A wide variation in cause means that with each
country entering the Global Programme the United Nations needs to
expend considerable resources to develop country-specific plans and
to implement those measures. While this appears practical when
considering the most corrupt states, it may not provide a useful
solution to target corruption in all economically and politically
vulnerable nations. The USD $6 million implementation cost appears
as a vast underestimation when thinking of tailoring programs to
each country. Questions arise concerning who will pay the costs of
such projects and what incentives they possess to do so.
Instituting a legal framework would not prove too costly.
Putting in place widespread educational projects to combat the
cultural roots of corruption, however, in conjunction with legislative
measures, would cost a great deal more. Therefore, the costs of the
U.N. Global Programme could prove too significant in the coming
years if the legislative and enforcement measures do not demonstrate
their efficacy.

VI. CONCLUSION

The U.N.'s Global Programme provides a significant stride by
recognizing corruption as a significant international problem with
sweeping consequences. Simply by having such a program the United
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Nations makes a considerable gain in the way of demonstrating that
this is a concern that will not be tolerated within the international
community. The fact that Nigeria, a state that arguably faces the
most pervasive amounts of corruption in the world, is involved in the
program speaks volumes of it. It demonstrates that the Programme
does not back away from the most difficult subjects.
The Programme possesses many shortcomings that its Nigerian
project may elucidate, however. While it does provide effective
legislative tools for willing countries and brings this problem to the
forefront of the international community, it still depends heavily on
structure and underestimates the costs of significant recovery. The
Programme does not adequately address all of the causes of
corruption. A social problem cannot remedy itself by adding more
structure. Nigeria demonstrates this because it already had anticorruption laws in place before its involvement in the Global
Programme. Therefore, more of the resources and programs within
such a project should be geared toward education and social
remediation.
Moreover, the Programme could strengthen itself by providing
more economic incentives for full compliance by Member States. This
could lessen the burden of fully remediating the problem from within,
which could prove to be costly and ineffective. Still, the Global
Programme supplies a key first step in this process-yet one should
only view it as a first step in a very long journey.
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